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ABSTRACT 
Reactive aggression is retaliatory behavior in response to a transgression from 
another, especially when self-control is compromised through cognitive exhaustion. 
This defensive reaction is especially pronounced when the transgression is made 
public, increasing the intensity of the status-threat experienced, but research is mixed 
on whether this is due to the experience of shame or damage to self-esteem. Self-
affirmation has been used in a variety of studies to reduce defensiveness and increase 
prosocial behavior, but there have been no studies to explore the effects of self-
affirmation on reactive aggression in non-clinical populations. Drawing from an 
undergraduate college student population (N=101), the present study examined the 
effects of self-affirmation and cognitive depletion tasks on the propensity to react 
aggressively in the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP), while measuring 
changes in implicit experiential state shame (ESS). State shame was found to be 
related to aggressive reaction; this shame was exacerbated by cognitive depletion and 
mediated by self-affirmation. The effects found were weak in a mixed sex sample, and 
this may be due to how males are differentially affected by the self-affirmation task, 
particularly when they are from a college student population. Gender differences and a 
critique of how aggression is operationally defined in research are discussed as 
confounding variables and suggested as potential areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“If the path of the peacemaker, of happiness, is being open and receptive and one with 
your experience, then settling the score is the path of making war, whereby aggression 
gives birth to aggression and violence gives birth to violence. Nothing is settled. 
Nothing is made even. But the mind of settling the score does not take that into 
consideration. When you are caught by that mind, because of the highly charged and 
ever-expanding emotionality you’re going through, you do not see what settling the 
score is really doing.”  
- From Choosing Peace (November 18, 2015) by Pema Chödrön 
The Social Valuation of Aggression 
 
Aggression can be defined as any kind of behavior, physical or verbal, that is 
intended to cause harm to another individual or group, and it is often categorized into 
two types – hostile or instrumental. Hostile aggression, better known in the literature 
as reactive aggression, is a spontaneous reaction based on increased feelings of anger. 
Instrumental aggression is the premeditated intent to injure, but as a means to an end, 
such as gaining, regaining, or maintaining status. Arguably, both reactive and 
premeditated aggression seem to have the same underlying mechanisms and 
motivations to mediate self-threat, but the relationship between these motivations and 
reactive aggression are less obvious because they are implicit. For example, 
frustration-aggression theory posits that frustration induces anger thereby increasing a 
readiness to aggress. Frustration is anything that blocks us from attaining our goal, 
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arising as a result of the disconnect between expectations and attainments, similar to 
the discomfort we experience during cognitive dissonance when our expected attitudes 
fail to line up with our exhibited behaviors. Frustration arises when one feels 
disrespected (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 
1996; Felson, 1978; Miller 2001) and also when someone feels as if they have been 
treated unfairly (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). One may react to implicit 
motivations to regain status in the moment (reactive), or may ruminate on how to 
regain that status in the future (premeditated). But how do we learn what types of 
behaviors will help us to regain that status? 
 Learned social behavior theory hypothesizes that we learn about aggressive 
behavior by experiencing the reward or punishment in response to that behavior. Later 
research by Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) suggested that we do not have to be 
directly involved but rather can watch behavior and subsequent consequences in order 
to facilitate learning; this version was termed observational or Social Learning Theory. 
Subsequent research supporting Social Learning Theory observed that children who 
are physically aggressive usually come from physically punitive parents (Patterson, 
Chamberlain, & Reid, 1982) and that 30% of those children will go on to abuse their 
own children, a rate four times greater than those who do not come from such a 
background (Kaufman & Zigler, 1987; Widom, 1989). Although the simple 
explanation for this seems to be that children who see or experience aggressive 
behavior in general will later exhibit similar behavior, the link may not be so direct. A 
later study found that spanking can be linked to aggression later in life, but when 
controlling for extreme forms of punishment and isolating families who deliver “tough 
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love,” these effects all but disappear (Gershoff, 2002). This implies that it is not 
simply the experience of physical punishment that directly leads to being aggressive, 
but rather there is some influence of the punisher’s intentionality that manifests itself 
later in life. In other words, children who are physically abused, as opposed to 
experiencing the culturally acceptable “tough love,” learn to develop self-worth 
contingent on how others treat them, a type of social comparison. They may grow up 
to be more aggressive because their sense of self-worth is more sensitive to negative 
judgment and unjustified punishment from others, and as such, the need to protect 
their self-worth may be more easily triggered.  
 There is more evidence that cultural cues play a key role in determining how 
someone becomes more prone to aggression. Some cultures, including mainstream 
America, value “toughness” in the form of masculinity, but additionally, the cultural 
value of defending one’s honor, as in the American South (Vandello, Cohen, & 
Ransom, 2008), increases both direct (e.g., physical) and indirect (e.g., gossiping) 
aggression as a way to compensate for any threats to status (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, 
& Schwarz, 1996; Miller, 2001; Nisbett, 1993; Willer, Rogalin, Conlon, & 
Wojnowicz, 2013; Wilson & Daly, 1985). Aggression is simultaneously taught to be a 
negative behavior, and socialized as an acceptable way to (re)affirm one’s self-worth. 
The cultural cues do not have to be from direct exposure to aggression, but can come 
in the form of exposure to objects and concepts that are associated with normalized or 
valued forms of interpersonal aggression, a process called priming. In one longitudinal 
study in Chicago, those who had even indirect exposure to gun violence were twice as 
likely to participate in violent acts themselves (Bingenheimer, Brennan, & Earls, 
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2005). Simply holding a gun can prime a person to have hostile thoughts and punitive 
judgments. However, this effect is limited to those who only have exposure to guns as 
representing status or dominance, and is not seen in those whose exposure is 
utilitarian, such as a hunter handling a rifle (Anderson, Benjamin, & Bartholow, 1998; 
Dienstbier et al., 1998). Further, moderate priming effects have been found after 
media consumption, including television and video games, resulting in direct (e.g., 
Eron, 1987) and indirect aggression, such as gossiping and ostracizing (Coyne & 
Archer, 2005) in children.  
In addition to normalizing aggression as a means to self-affirm, media often 
label aggressive acts as “justified” or “unjustified,” giving a person excuses to draw on 
when trying to reduce the cognitive dissonance. The Fundamental Attribution Error 
(Ross, 1977) is one cognitive shortcut wherein we view our own negative actions as 
having some sort of external justification and blame the negative actions of others on 
internal traits, maintaining our worth while decreasing theirs. This works in reverse for 
positive actions. We tend to attribute our own positive acts to our own internal traits; 
however, if the positive act is that of another, we tend to attribute it to outer 
circumstances (Malle, 2006). This also perpetuates the just-world phenomenon, or the 
idea that “you get what you give,” which in addition to justifying our direct actions, 
helps us justify not acting when we see others being victimized (Furnham, 2003). This 
is enhanced through our ability to depersonalize others to further reduce cognitive 
dissonance when our explicit actions (or inactions) do not match the values we claim 
to hold. 
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The Social Learning Theory of aggression is generally supported throughout 
the literature, but the misconception that the effects of exposure to aggression are a 
direct influence on behavior and not part of a larger system of self-worth evaluation 
and social comparison needs to be more comprehensively addressed. For example, 
there are children who grow up in violent neighborhoods and therefore would be 
expected to become violent themselves, but they do not. This exposure to violence, 
directly or through media, may not be the driving force behind why people resort to 
aggression in the face of adversity. Rather, it may be the direct experience of feeling 
ashamed when experiencing aggression that normalizes using external sources to 
determine self-worth, which, in turn, sensitizes one to self-threat and normalizes the 
use of aggression when attempting to compensate for it. 
Research to date has not attempted to make much of a connection regarding the 
relationship between self-worth compensation, self-affirmation, and shame, 
particularly in non-clinical populations. This research attempts to fill that void.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Reactive Aggression 
 
Reactive aggression is a retaliatory response to actual or perceived 
provocation, often associated with a lack of impulse control (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2006). A study done with criminal offenders showed relations 
between decreased self-control and a variety of undesirable behaviors, such as 
negative interactions and assaults on prison staff, substance abuse, rule breaking (e.g., 
carrying a weapon), and retaliatory actions against other inmates (DeLisi, Hochstetler, 
Higgins, Beaver, & Graeve, 2008). In a later study (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, & 
Schofield, 2011), reactive aggression was shown to be reduced by going through self-
control training, particularly in those who scored higher in aggression initially.  
Aggression as a Response to Status Threat 
 
There is no shortage of studies that find aggression as a response to status 
threat. Status is often reflected in how one is treated by others. When one feels 
disrespected, it is interpreted as a direct threat to their status. Studies have repeatedly 
shown that disrespect provokes anger, with increased aggression if that disrespect is 
made in a public setting (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; D. Cohen et al., 1996; Felson, 
1978; Miller, 2001). Because status is determined through social comparison, it is no 
wonder that being socially disrespected increases the effects of shame and subsequent 
action to regain status. One could argue that aggression in response to being shamed is 
a form of self-affirmation. Even just through affirming “toughness” prior to a threat, 
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one can proactively maintain their status, effectively avoiding shame (D. Cohen et al., 
1996; Lukeszowski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016). Particularly in cultures 
that value defending one’s honor, such as the American South or violent gangs, as 
well as cultures socializing hegemonic masculinity, this fast and firm reaction to a 
status threat is imperative, as anything less is perceived as weak (D. Cohen et al., 
1996; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2009; Miller, 2001; Nisbett, 1993; 
Wilson & Daly, 1985). Because direct aggression is more easily measured than 
indirect, and men are socialized to exhibit masculinity in the form of direct, physical 
aggression, it is often overlooked that women also commit aggressive acts in response 
to status threat, because these acts are often more indirect and verbal (Willer et al., 
2013). 
 It is important to note that the higher one perceives their status to be, the more 
they value that social positioning (Blader & Chen, 2012). So even though higher status 
individuals are protected to some extent from lower level threats, they often respond 
more intensely to acute threats to their position (Gruenwald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006), 
which indicates that one can have a high sense of self-worth, but if it is based on 
external sources of validation, they are just as, if not more, susceptible to shame. This 
may explain the mixed results in studies that look at implicit and explicit self-esteem 
in the face of a threat to self-worth, particularly when a person is being measured 
against someone higher in status. Several experiments have shown that experiencing 
this threat actually increases implicit self-esteem through compensation but reduces 
explicit self-esteem (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), while other studies have 
shown explicit self-esteem to increase (e.g., Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Pyszczynski, 
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Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Conversely, another study looked at 
high versus low self-esteem as a moderator for self-affirmation effectiveness and 
found no relationship (Harris & Napper, 2005). This also offers an explanation for 
why studies find that narcissists tend to express anger and use aggression when 
attempting to avoid negative experiences (e.g., shame; Bushman et al., 2009). It 
appears that aggression, therefore, is a reaction to a threat to one’s status and self-
worth, particularly if they are founded on an external source of validation. 
Self-Affirmation: An Internal Source of Validation 
 
 Self-affirmation theory states that “people are motivated to preserve a positive, 
moral, and adaptive self-image and to maintain self-integrity” and that this process can 
be accomplished through reinforcing core values that are particularly important to the 
person, increasing one’s self-worth (Steele, 1988). Some of the earlier studies using 
this theory examined the neutralizing effects of self-affirmation on threats to the self, 
such as cognitive dissonance (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983) 
and rumination over being labeled as unintelligent (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, 
& Dijksterhuis, 1999).  
Following these earlier studies, which made connections between self-threat 
and self-affirmation, researchers in health psychology began to use a variety of self-
affirmation techniques. They investigated self-affirmation as a buffer to self-threat 
prior to health interventions so that recipients of messages would be more likely to 
accept the warnings instead of being closed off and defensive to a message that 
challenged their life choices. Results from many of these studies indicate that those 
who went through a self-affirmation manipulation were more likely to be accepting of 
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health messages regarding caffeine consumption and breast cancer (Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998), alcohol consumption (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011; Harris & 
Napper, 2005), healthy eating habits (Epton & Harris, 2008), and smoking risks 
(Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 2008; Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 
2007), especially when they were at greater risk. Additionally, in a double-blind study 
by Armitage and others (2008), the self-affirmation manipulation was done 
successfully at a factory employing a lower socioeconomic status (SES) population 
with high-risk smokers, confirming the generalizability of the self-affirmation 
procedure on a population that was less educated than the usual university sample. 
Clearly, self-affirmation is a technique that is gaining attention because of its 
demonstrated utility in many areas, as well as its ease of implementation. The studies 
listed above used different self-affirmation techniques, such as writing long essays, 
answering questions about helpfulness, or acknowledging one’s values. The variety of 
techniques allows the researcher to choose between a longer or shorter task, as well as 
choosing a simpler version for those outside of the university population, such as 
adolescents (Sherman et al., 2013) and those with less education (Armitage et al., 
2008).  
The Relevance of Cognitive Depletion 
 
Increased cognitive load, known as ego depletion or cognitive depletion, is 
experienced when the mind is working on a task and, in relation to research, it can be 
imposed by requiring a person to do anything that involves their attention, such as 
solving a puzzle, calling attention to detail, or multitasking.  Cognitive depletion is 
related to reduced self-control, as exemplified by emotional regulation, the ability to 
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delay gratification, and the capacity to resist temptation, among other consequences 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Depletion of self-control has been linked to increases 
in unethical behavior (i.e., cheating; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011) as well 
as increased aggression when provoked (Denson et al., 2011; DeWall et al., 2006). 
Some of the earlier studies examined the neutralizing effects of self-affirmation on 
threats to the self, such as cognitive dissonance (Aronson et al., 1995; Steele & Liu, 
1983). Participants who went through the self-affirmation exercise showed an increase 
in self-control, as demonstrated through a variety of tasks, such as pain tolerance, task 
persistence, and delay of gratification, but only after experiencing a manipulated 
cognitive depletion, which suggests that affirmation may help a person regain self-
control back to baseline, but not necessarily improve beyond that (Schmeichel & 
Vohs, 2009).  
The relationship between self-affirmation and implicit cognition measures has 
been established more recently.  Cognitive functioning in general, as measured by a 
problem-solving task, was improved after a self-affirming task (Wen, Butler, & 
Koutstaal, 2013). Sherman and others (2013) conducted a longitudinal study 
examining the effects of self-affirmation on identity threat (i.e., stereotype threat) in 
young Latino American students. They showed that a variety of self-affirming 
exercises actually closed the academic achievement gap between Latino American and 
European American students, wherein the Latino American students’ grades increased, 
but the European American students’ grades did not. Similarly, Schmeichel and Vohs 
(2009) reported increases in self-control in response to the self-affirmation task, but 
only after ego depletion.  Additionally, in a diary self-report, these students described 
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feeling that they fit in more and had more motivation to do well. It is noteworthy that 
for many students this effect continued for three years (Sherman et al., 2013). This 
attenuation of stereotype threat through self-affirmation was also found by Shapiro, 
Williams, and Hambarchyan (2013) in Black college student’s performance, as well as 
women’s interest and performance in the STEM (i.e., science, technology, 
engineering, and math) disciplines. Self-affirmation has also been shown to buffer 
threats to self-esteem and subsequent resentful and defensive reactivity, which is 
discussed in more detail in the section on shame and self-esteem (Monin, Sawyer, & 
Marquez, 2008).   
Shame and Affirmation 
 
Shame and affirmation are the negative or positive (respectively) feelings 
gained from an experience that contributes to one’s self-worth. Shame is the feeling 
that there is something inherently bad or wrong within oneself, not to be confused with 
the closely related feeling of guilt – the feeling that one did something wrong. To 
clarify, shame is internal blame for a behavior or an attribution that is a reflection of 
the self, as opposed to guilt, in which although the behavior itself was bad, the action 
did not stem from something innately wrong with the self. Shame is a feeling gained 
from an experience that negates our sense of internal goodness or adherence to values 
that we view as positive because of the perception (real or imagined) of a negative 
evaluation from others (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Cognitive 
dissonance then results from this misalignment of behavior and valued attitude. 
Conversely, affirmation is a feeling gained from a positive experience that reaffirms 
our internal goodness or adherence to values that we view as positive. This affirmation 
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can originate from internal or external sources, depending on whether the value being 
exhibited is externally or internally derived. This internal versus external source of 
affirmation is not to be confused with the concept of internal and external locus of 
control. Several studies have shown contradictory evidence as to whether locus of 
control is related to shame, indicating that the external locus of control may be a 
byproduct of repeated, context-specific shame experiences (e.g., Parsons & Betz, 
2001), a failure to meet the expectations from external sources, like societal norms 
(Madding, 1995), or a failure to meet the expectation from internal sources, for 
example, in those who are “perfectionists” (Amster, 1994).  
Shame, not Self-Esteem. Self-esteem can be viewed as three separate 
constructs (see Brown & Marshall, 2006) – domain specific (i.e., social comparison in 
abilities and attributes), state-based (i.e., the immediate feelings of shame or 
affirmation from an experience), and global (i.e., self-esteem derived from a collection 
of shame and affirmation experiences, which remains fairly stable in adulthood). 
Domain- and state-based self-esteem are the feelings of self-worth attached to status, 
which contribute to global self-esteem. Again, the higher one perceives their status to 
be, the more they value their social position (Blader & Chen, 2012), and they respond 
more intensely to threats to their position (Gruenwald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006), 
especially narcissists (Bushman et al., 2009). Global self-esteem is a product of the 
compounding effects of shame and affirmation experiences that determine one’s status 
in different domains, and varies significantly from person to person depending on 
what they value. Using this theory, the contradictory outcomes in research on the 
relationship between self-affirmation and self-esteem can be explained. Self-
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affirmation exercises buffer threats to status, regardless of how high or low one 
perceives one’s status to be. If someone is low in status in several domains, they are 
likely low in global self-esteem. Conversely, if they are higher in status across several 
domains, they are likely to be higher in global self-esteem. Self-affirmation buffers a 
threat to their status, which has the potential to affect measures of their domain and 
state self-esteem if their status in that situation is valued. We would not see immediate 
effects in the collective or averaged global self-esteem because after a lifetime of 
experiences, one event would be unlikely to make a measurable difference in the 
average. In sum, depending on the type of self-esteem being measured (global, 
domain, or state) and the perceived value of that status in a particular domain or state, 
researchers may or may not find measurable changes or differences in self-esteem, but 
they may find differences in shame proneness (trait shame) and changes in feelings of 
shame before and after an attack on their status (state shame). 
Present Study 
 
Reactive aggression has been found to be directly related to weak self-control 
and retaliatory behavior (DeLisi et al., 2008; DeWall et al., 2006). However, reactive 
aggression can be attenuated through self-control training (Denson et al., 2011). 
Studies have repeatedly shown that disrespect provokes anger, with increased 
aggression if that disrespect is made in a public setting (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; 
Cohen et al., 1996; Felson, 1978; Miller, 2001). With status being determined through 
social comparison, it is no wonder that being socially disrespected increases the effects 
of shame and subsequent action to regain status. Self-affirmation tasks have been used 
in a variety of areas to reduce defensiveness (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000), offset 
 14 
 
feelings of schadenfreude (van Dijk, van Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk, & Wesseling 
2011), increase prosocial feelings and behaviors (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, & 
Reijntjes, 2012), buffer self-esteem (Monin et al., 2008), and restore self-control after 
ego depletion (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). One could argue that aggression as a 
response to being shamed is itself a form of affirmation. Even just through affirming 
“toughness” prior to a threat, one can proactively maintain their status, effectively 
avoiding shame (Cohen et al., 1996; Lukeszowski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 
2016). A recent study indirectly used self-affirmation to reduce aggression by 
augmenting a message aimed to reduce relational aggression, in which damage is 
caused to someone’s relationships or social status (Armitage & Rowe, 2016). Only 
one study (Thomaes, Bushman, de Castro, Cohen, & Denissen, 2009) was found that 
explored the direct effects of a self-affirmation exercise on aggression; the authors 
found that self-affirmation can attenuate the self-threat experienced by narcissistic 
adolescents. However, research has yet to investigate the effects of self-affirmation on 
aggression in a non-clinical sample of adults. Accordingly, the present study will 
examine these effects, as well as the interaction between self-affirmation and cognitive 
depletion on reactive aggression to social provocation, defined as a threat to social 
status but not necessarily a threat to self-esteem, as measured by the Point Subtraction 
Aggression game. This task allows us to measure aggression in a controlled, 
laboratory setting under the guise of a competitive one on one game of speed and 
decision making abilities. The participants will be under the impression that they are 
competing against a real opponent, but they will actually be responding to computer 
generated provocations. 
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Hypothesis 1. Reactive aggression will be greater for those in the cognitive 
depletion group and the explicit shame group versus the control group. In other words, 
if a person is cognitively exhausted through either direct (cognitive depletion) or 
indirect (completing a shame measure) means, they will react more aggressively. 
Hypothesis 2. Reactive aggression will be attenuated by completion of the 
self-affirmation task in the cognitive depletion group and shame group, but not in the 
control group. 
Hypothesis 3. Experiential Shame Scale (ESS – an implicit shame measure) 
scores will be significantly greater in the cognitive depletion and shame group (versus 
the control), and will be attenuated by completion of the self-affirmation task (versus 
the control). 
Hypothesis 4. Implicit and explicit shame sub-scores will be predictors of 
reactive aggression. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Design 
 The current study was both a within- and between-subjects experimental 
design wherein participants were randomly assigned to one of six groups in a 3 x 2 
factorial design. The first independent variable was being assigned to either 
completing a cognitive depletion writing task, a control writing task, or a shame-
measurement task, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, version 3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney, 
Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000). The second independent variable was 
completing a self-affirmation (SA) writing task or an “other-affirmation” (OA) 
focused control writing task. Then they each compete independently in the Point 
Subtraction Aggression game. In addition to the between-subject differences described 
above, all participants complete an implicit shame measure both before these tasks and 
after the final aggression measure to examine within-subject changes for each group. 
Participants 
Participants included in the study were 107 undergraduate students from the 
University of Rhode Island in undergraduate psychology courses (i.e. General 
Psychology, PSY113 and Quantitative Methods, PSY200). Six participants’ scores 
were excluded for not meeting certain criteria (see Analysis of Assumptions).  
Procedure 
 For recruitment purposes as well as to increase interest in “winning” the game, 
students were informed that by participating, they would be winning entries into a 
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drawing for a $100 Visa gift card. In fact, all students received one entry into the 
drawing for participating. Upon signing up for the study, the student was assigned a 
unique participant ID number reflective of the randomly assigned condition (See Table 
1) to ensure responses were all associated with the same subject but anonymity was 
preserved. They were brought into an office where they sat down at a computer station 
and were given instructions on what to expect as well as a verbal run through of the 
informed consent. The study was explained as an investigation on how several 
cognitive exhaustion procedures affect reaction time and decision making. They were 
told they would complete some questionnaires and hand written cognitive depletion 
tasks while the other participant located in an adjacent room did a similar series of 
tasks. When “both” participants finished with the pre-game tasks, they would play a 
game with one another on the computer that measures reaction time and decision 
making. After receiving answers to any questions, the participant reviewed the 
informed consent on the computer screen and selected “I Accept” at the bottom if they 
were willing to participate. The computer screen then told them to await further 
instruction. Next, the research assistant gave the participant Harber’s (1995) Sources 
of Validation Scale, which contained a list of traits and values (see Appendix A), and 
asked them to rank order this list in order of personal importance to them, with one 
being the most important through number 11 being the least important.  Afterwards, 
they completed the following measures and tasks as determined by their randomly 
assigned condition.  
 “Pre-physical and cognitive state” questionnaire. First, all participants 
completed the Experiential Shame Scale (ESS; Turner, 1998, 2014; see Appendix B) 
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on the computer console which aimed to measure their baseline state shame under the 
guise of being a physical and cognitive state questionnaire. They were told that this 
was to measure their baseline and post-experiment physical and cognitive state from 
their subjective perspective. Participants were asked to select a number from 1 to 7 for 
each item, corresponding to how they felt at that moment on a continuum between two 
opposite word states, with some of the items being reverse scored. There were three 
categories (Physical, Emotional, and Social) relating to the sensations and experiences 
of shame while retaining low face validity. The “physical” category had three items 
(ex. Physically I feel… 1 = very warm – 7 = very cool). The “emotional” category had 
four items (ex. Emotionally I feel… 1 = content – 7 = distressed). Finally, the “social” 
category had three standard items (ex. Socially I feel like… 1 = talking – 7 = being 
quiet) and one that was modified to fit the current research. The original body of 
research pertained to academic performance and used 1 = “I AM willing to talk about 
my grades with an acquaintance right now” to 7 = “I AM NOT willing to talk about 
my grades with an acquaintance right now.” In an attempt to capture this from a 
competitive / status standpoint, this research will use 1 = “If asked, my peers would 
say I have ABOVE AVERAGE cognitive speed” to 7 = “If asked, my peers would say 
I have BELOW AVERAGE cognitive speed.” The entire measure can be found in 
Appendix B. When participants finished, the computer screen either instructed them to 
continue to the next questionnaire or to raise their hand to ask the research assistant for 
further instruction. 
 It was decided to use the ESS as a shame marker because it is a covert measure 
of shame. The importance of using a covert measure of shame has been highlighted in 
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the literature review but cannot be stressed enough because of the sensitive nature of 
our implicit cognition to mere exposure to emotional words. This is the only measure 
of state shame to the author’s knowledge that does not use any sort of explicit 
emotional words that connect with experiences of shame, guilt, or embarrassment. 
Rüsch et al. (2007) found that the ESS measure had some overlap with measures of 
anxiety, however, many of our physiological reactions are self-described as anxiety 
and when these feelings of arousal are explored in relation to the context in which they 
are experienced, we find they are often misattributed based on manipulated conditions 
(e.g., Dutton & Aron, 1974; Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998; Schacter 
& Singer, 1962). Arguably, it is more socially acceptable to claim one is anxious than 
to admit one feels shame, so careful consideration of the context in which the feelings 
occur is important in interpreting them from an objective perspective.  
In 2014, Turner explored the effectiveness of the ESS scale in several studies 
using shame as the predicted response to an experience of perceived failure elicited by 
academic exam score feedback, wherein she successfully demonstrated satisfactory 
inter-item construct validity (Cronbach’s α = 0.72) and good concurrent validity with 
measures of shame, as well as state and global self-esteem.  Furthermore, qualitative 
feedback through interviews included reports of feelings of failure, wanting to “crawl 
in a hole,” and wanting to hide the poor grade received from others, and other 
theoretically related reactions associated with shame, such as reporting physiological 
feelings of “heart sinking” and upset stomach that can be (mis)attributed to any of 
several causes depending on the context. Further, the ESS showed no significant 
correlation with social desirability, perhaps one of the most important factors after 
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scale validity in measuring such a delicate topic. Therefore, through careful 
consideration of the research question at hand, the ESS seemed like the best option for 
an implicit shame measure, particularly since the current study will also have a 
condition wherein an explicit shame measure is used. 
 “Cognitive depletion” tasks. Depending on the group the participant was 
randomly assigned to, they either completed the cognitive depletion exercise, its 
associated control exercise, or the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, version 3 (TOSCA-
3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000; see Appendix C), followed by 
either the self-affirmation task or its associated control exercise.  
 Cognitive depletion manipulation. If the participant was randomly assigned to 
the ego depletion task or the control task, the computer instructed them to raise their 
hand to alert the research assistant who was prepared to give them the appropriate 
instruction for their assigned task. In the cognitive depletion task, they were asked to 
write a story about any recent trip (e.g., grocery store, different state, or different 
country) but to avoid using the letters “a” or “n.” In the control group, participants 
were asked to write the same story, but with no such constraint. The participants wrote 
for 6 minutes. This technique has been used successfully in prior studies (e.g., 
Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). After the 6 minutes passed, the research assistant let them 
know by tapping the participant on the shoulder and collected the form. 
 TOSCA-3. If the participant was assigned to complete the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3) questionnaire, upon completion of the ESS survey they 
were told to click continue and proceeded onto the next screen. The instructions asked 
the participant to imagine themselves in 16 different scenarios (11 negative and 5 
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positive) and indicate how likely they would be to react in the given ways on a scale of 
1 (“not likely”) to 5 (“very likely”). Each described reaction measures shame, guilt, 
externalization of blame, or detachment (in negative scenarios), or guilt, shame, 
externalization of blame, or pride (in positive scenarios). An example of a hypothetical 
negative scenario would be, “You break something at work and then hide it.” The 
response options are as follows: guilt “You would think: ‘This is making me anxious. 
I need to either fix it or get someone else to.’”, shame “You would think about 
quitting”, externalization of blame “You would think: ‘A lot of things aren’t made 
very well these days.’”, and detached “You would think: ‘It was only an accident.’” 
The entire measure can be found in Appendix C. The TOSCA remains one of the most 
widely used measures of shame and guilt and its wide range of reliability and validity 
studies across many subject pools, including college students, is discussed in Tangney, 
Dearing, Wagner, and Gramzow (2000). Upon completion, the screen had the 
participant raise their hand to alert the research assistant that they were ready for the 
next task. 
Self-affirmation manipulation. Next, participants completed the self-
affirmation or control written task. In the self-affirmation condition, also described to 
the participant as a cognitive depletion task, the research assistant used their highest 
ranked value from Harber’s (1995) Sources of Validation Scale and the participant 
was instructed to write about why this value was important to them and to describe 
three or four occasions when they exhibited this value. In the control condition, they 
were given instructions that asked them to write about the value ranked 7th, of 
moderate to lower value, and why that value may be important to the average college 
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student. The participants wrote for 10 minutes. This manipulation has been 
successfully used in previous studies in combination with cognitive depletion (e.g., 
Monin et al., 2008). The need to keep the self-affirmation condition deceptive and 
labeled as a cognitive task was decided upon because in one series of studies it was 
found that the effects of self-affirmation are weakened when the participants become 
aware of the process and expected outcomes (Sherman et al., 2009). After the 10 
minutes had passed, the research assistant alerted the participant and collected the 
form. 
Measure of reactive aggression.  Next, the participant competed in the Point 
Subtraction Aggression Paradigm-First Session (PSAP-FS; Cherek, 1981), a 
laboratory based measure of reactive aggressive in which participants believe they are 
paired with a real opponent (actually a computer) to compete for points that can be 
exchanged for a reward. The participant is told that the goal of the task is to 
accumulate more points than their opponent. In the current experiment, participants 
were told that they could trade in their points for entries in the raffle for the gift card.  
Prior to the research session, the following instructions (adapted from Cherek, 
Lane, Dougherty, Moeller, & White, 2000) for the PSAP portion were given to them 
and read aloud by the research assistant.  
For your next task, you will be able to earn points which 
will be exchanged for entries into the raffle for the $100 gift 
card. You will be paired up with another participant located in 
the alternative lab site in the building. 
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You will play a game against another participant located at an 
alternative lab site in the building for 25 minutes. You have been 
randomly assigned to the Point Deletion condition, and the second 
participant has been assigned to the Point Stealing condition. 
As you can see, the response controller has three buttons labeled 
A, B, and C. When the session starts, the letters A, B, and C and a 
counter will appear on the computer screen. The counter will be at zero. 
Pushing the A button will cause the B and C letter to go off the screen. 
Pushing the A button approximately 100 times will cause the A letter to 
go off the screen, and add one point to the counter. Each point is worth 
one raffle entry. After about one second, the A, B, and C letters will 
come back on the computer screen. At that time you can continue to 
press A or switch to button B or C.  
During the session the counter on your computer screen may 
become larger and one point will be subtracted. After the point is 
subtracted, the counter will return to its normal size. This means that 
one of the other persons has subtracted a point from your counter by 
pushing button B on their response panel. Every point that this person 
subtracts from your counter is added to their counter. 
If you push button B on your response panel, the A and C letters 
will go off the screen. After you have pushed button B approximately 
10 times, the letter B will go off the screen and one point will be 
subtracted from the other person’s counter. After about one second, A, 
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B, and C letters will come back on the computer screen. You 
can continue to press button B and subtract additional points 
from the other person or switch to button A to gain points or C. 
If you subtract a point from the other person, it will not be 
added to your counter. Remember, points that are subtracted 
from your counter by the other person are added to that person’s 
counter.  
If you push button C on your response panel, the A and 
B letters will go off the screen. After you have pushed button C 
approximately 10 times, the letter C will go off the screen and 
your earnings displayed on the counter will be protected from 
point subtractions initiated by the other person for some period 
of time. After about one second, the A, B, and C letters will 
come back on the computer screen. You can continue to press 
button C or switch to button A or B. 
In summary, pressing A 100 times gains you a point, 
pressing B 10 times deletes a point from your opponent, and 
pressing C 10 times will protect your points from your opponent 
for a short period of time. 
 
No additional information regarding the procedure was provided. Portions of 
the instructions were repeated if the subjects asked questions. Studies show its validity 
in measuring aggression (i.e. tendency to push the B button) with a variety of 
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populations, such as male parolees convicted of violent versus non-violent crimes 
(Cherek, Moeller, Schnapp, & Dougherty, 1997; Cherek, Schnapp, Moeller, & 
Dougherty, 1996), in children with aggression issues and ADHD (Casat, Pearson, van 
Davelaar, & Cherek, 1995), and moderate correlations between aggression on the 
PSAP and self-report measures (Gerra et al., 2001, 2007). Several studies have also 
used the measure with undergraduate college students (e.g., Pinto, Maltby, Wood, & 
Day, 2012). A shorter version of the original PSAP using just the first session (PSAP-
FS; approximately 25 minutes) was validated for potential use in expanded settings 
when multiple trials over the course of hours and/or days was too time consuming 
(Golomb, Cortez-Perez, Jaworski, Mednick, & Dimsdale, 2007).  
The proportion of times the participant chooses the B button response, 
subtracting a point from the opponent (a behavior intending to cause harm) with no 
potential gain of the point to their own total, as compared to A and C is the measure of 
aggression (PSAP B ratio: # of times B Option/A + B + C Options = Aggression 
Score). 
 “Post-physical and cognitive state” questionnaire. Afterwards, participants 
all filled out the Experiential Shame Scale (ESS; Turner, 1998, 2014) again to measure 
their current state shame to be compared to scores on the ESS pre-test at the 
beginning, once again under the guise of being a physical and cognitive state 
questionnaire. 
 Demographic Questions. Finally, the participants filled out a demographic 
questionnaire on the computer that asked them about their identified sex, 
race/ethnicity, age, college major, a variation of the MacArthur subjective community 
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and national socioeconomic status (SES; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), 
and political and social values (see Appendix D). 
 Debriefing. Upon completion of the post-ESS, participants saw a thank you 
message on the computer screen and were asked to report to the lab attendant that they 
were ready for debriefing. They were informed that we were looking at the interaction 
of self-affirmation and cognitive depletion on aggression levels. They were told that 
every participant got entered into the drawing for the $100 gift card and that there was 
never an actual “opponent,” but rather they were responding to computer generated 
provocations that were trying to elicit a response of aggressiveness (B-button) or 
defensiveness (C-button). We gauged the extent to which the deception worked (e.g., 
surprised look, asked them for feedback) and it was recorded in our participant 
records. The participant was thanked for their time and asked to sign an “affidavit” 
that they would keep their knowledge about the current study to themselves to ensure 
a clean slate for each participant in the future. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 The data were downloaded from Survey Monkey and Inquisit 5.0 (for the 
PSAP) into Microsoft Office Excel for organization and then uploaded into SPSS 23.0 
for subsequent analysis. 
Demographics 
 
One hundred and one participants were included in the final data analysis. 
Reasons for the exclusion of some participants are given under Analysis of 
Assumptions. The majority of participants identified as female (n = 73; 72.3%). Of the 
101 participants, 64% identified as Caucasian / European / White, 21% Native 
American / Mexican / Hispanic, 12% African American / Black / West Indies, and 3% 
Asian / Pacific Islander. It should be noted that some participants selected more than 
one identity, and so the percentages reported should not be computed to represent the 
raw number. The participants ranged from 19 to 29 years of age (M=19.76, 
SD=1.372). Participants identified their preferred political party as either Independent 
(43.6%), Democrat (24.7%), Libertarian, (17.8%), or Republican (13.9%), as well 
their social values as being primarily Moderate (43.6%), Liberal (24.8%), Libertarian 
(16.8%), or Conservative (14.8%). 
The subjective social status (see Table 2) was negatively skewed, more so for 
the community standing (Mean=11.95, Median=12, Mode=16) than the national 
standing (Mean=10.23, Median=11, Mode=11), which is reflective of the population 
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wherein 53% of the student body came from the top 20% of earners, with a median 
family income of $115,600, according to recent data collected by The Equality of 
Opportunity Project (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017). 
Analysis of Assumptions 
 
 Assumptions were assessed for the general linear model, including normality, 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, skewness and kurtosis, and identification of 
outliers (z-score >= 3), using scatterplots, Q-Q plots, box and whisker graphs, and 
histograms. Six participants were considered outliers because they were found to have 
too few total points in the PSAP (n=3), indicating a lack of effort or understanding, or 
no attempts at the B option were made and the participant vocalized suspicion of the 
attempted deception (n=3), and were excluded from the data analysis, resulting in the 
final N, 101. No data were found to be missing.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Full descriptive values, including means and standard deviations (see Table 2) 
and frequencies for discrete variables (see Table 3) are available in the Appendix. 
Pearson correlations were unsurprisingly significant for several pairs of variables (see 
Table 4).  
Hypotheses 1 & 2: Cognitive Depletion, Self-Affirmation, and Reactive 
Aggression 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to evaluate the effects of the 
cognitive depletion / TOSCA tasks and self-affirmation tasks on reactive aggression. 
There was no significant interaction between the self-affirmation group and the 
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cognitive depletion group (M = 27.611, SE = 3.654), the TOSCA group (M = 34.782, 
SE = 3.766), and the control group (M = 26.887, SE = 4.026) compared to the other-
affirmation control (MCognitiveDepletion = 32.124, SECognitiveDepletion = 3.456; MTOSCA = 
29.345, SETOSCA = 3.89; MControl = 27.991, SEControl = 3.368), F(2, 95)=.924, p=.40, 
partial η2=.019, but the explicit shame measure followed by self-affirmation condition 
did trend opposite to the hypothesis and the other groups (see Figure 1). Although the 
means trended in the hypothesized direction between the cognitive depletion group (M 
= 29.867, SE = 2.515), the TOSCA group (M = 32.064, SE = 2.707), and the control 
group (M = 27.439, SE = 2.625), the ANOVA was not significant and carried a small 
effect size, F(2,95)=.754, p=.473, partial η2=.016. A follow up t-test for self-
affirmation (M=29.8365, SE=2.135) and other-affirmation (M=29.8213, SE=2.0873) 
revealed no significant differences in reactive aggression as well, t(99)=.005, p=.996, 
95% CI [-5.9291, 5.9595]. 
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive Depletion, Self-Affirmation, and ESS  
 
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to compare the ESS 
post-scores between cognitive groups, affirmation groups, and their interaction, while 
controlling for differences in ESS pre-scores to isolate the effect the independent 
variables had on Experiential State Shame (see Figure 2). Overall, there was a 
difference between cognitive groups, F(2, 94)=6.926, p=.002, η 2 =.128, with follow-
up test indicating a significant difference between both  the cognitive depletion 
(M=39.836, SE=.904, p=.018) and TOSCA (M=40.922, SE=.974, p=.002) groups 
compared to the control group (M=36.156, SE=.943). There was a significant 
difference in ESS post-scores between the self-affirmation (M=37.146, SE=.792) 
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group and other-affirmation (M=40.797, SE=.742), F(1,94)=11.319, p=.001, η 2 =.107. 
No interaction between cognitive groups and affirmation was found, F(2, 94)=1.151, 
p=.321, η 2 =.024. 
Hypothesis 4: Implicit and Explicit Shame and Reactive Aggression 
 
Significant but small relationships were found between reactive aggression and 
both the ESS pre- (r=.221, p=.026) and post-scores (r=.231, p=.02), but not at all 
between reactive aggression and any of the TOSCA subscales, including shame. 
However, ESS post-scores did have moderately sized relationships with TOSCA’s 
shame (r=.411, p=.022), externalization of blame (r=.366, p=.043), and detachment 
(r=.374, p=.038), and approached significance in an inverse relationship with guilt 
(r=-.343, p=.059). Relationships involving ESS pre-scores were slightly larger with 
shame (r=.464, p=.009) and externalization of blame (r=.566, p=.001), with 
nonsignificant but similar trends with guilt (r=-.309, p=.091) and detachment (r=.345, 
p=.057). 
To further explore the differences between those higher and lower in ESS post-
scores, a median split was done to categorize high ESS (n=53, M=45.62, SE=.681) and 
low ESS (n=48, M=31.79, SE=.598). There was a significant difference in reactive 
aggression between the high (M=33.0488, SE=2.07386) and low (M=26.2725, 
SE=2.03226) ESS groups, t(99)=2.326, p=.022, Cohen’s d=.4642, 95%CI[.99471, 
12.55773]. There was also a significant difference in shame scores between high 
(n=19, M=54.37, SE=1.573) and low (n=12, M=47.45, SE=2.323) ESS groups, 
t(29)=2.097, p=.021, Cohen’s d = .925664, 95%CI[1.09, 12.147], as well as 
externalization of blame scores for the high (M=38.95, SE=1.989) and low (M=32.92, 
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SE=1.764) ESS groups, t(29)=2.097, p=.045, Cohen’s d= .803909, 95%CI[.149, 
11.912]. 
Exploratory Data Analysis: Gender Differences 
 
 Unexpected differences were found between those identifying as male (n=28) 
and female (n=73). Although not significant, the data trend was reversed in that, for 
males, aggression was greater in the self-affirmation condition (n=11, M=35.1847, 
SD=11.9718) than the other-affirmation condition (n=17, M=29.8174, SD=13.3991), 
compared to females, where aggression was slightly less in the self-affirmation 
condition (n=36, M=28.2023, SD=15.1319) than the other-affirmation condition 
(n=37, M=29.8231, SD=16.327; see Figure 3). This interaction was observed in the 
cognitive depletion and control conditions, but for the TOSCA condition, self-
affirmation resulted in increased aggression scores for both males (n=4, M=38.1867, 
SD=15.81363) and females (n=36, M=33.6475, SD=16.99534) compared to other-
affirmation (n=5, MMALES=26.86445, SD=16.02585; n=37, MFEMALES=30.5857, 
SD=18.72272). ESS post-scores did follow the hypothesized trend of being greater in 
the other-affirmation as compared to the self-affirmation groups (see Figure 4), 
indicating a divergence in the relationship between ESS and aggression (rMEN=.078, 
p=.693; rWOMEN=.327, p=.005). Obviously, a larger sample size is needed to further 
explore if these trends persist.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 The present study attempted to manipulate reactive aggression by randomly 
assigning some participants to complete cognitively exhausting tasks followed by 
either self-affirmation or other-affirmation tasks to examine a potential attenuation of 
that behavior. Implicit experiential shame was predicted to have a positive relationship 
with reactive aggression. As predicted, the cognitive depletion and TOSCA survey 
task increased feelings of implicit experiential shame, which were reduced by the 
completion of the self-affirmation task, but the results were mixed on the reactive 
aggression measure. Participants in the TOSCA condition who completed the follow 
up self-affirmation task were actually more aggressive than those who completed the 
other-affirmation task, a finding contrary to the initial hypothesis and to the trend of 
the cognitive depletion group. Further exploratory analysis found that gender may be 
playing a role in the variance that lessened the expected effects found between groups. 
Valuation and motivation of outcomes as well as gender differences could offer some 
explanation as to why the results were more inconclusive and mixed than expected. 
Can We Really Measure Aggression? 
 
Self-affirmation and cognitive depletion, both alone and in conjunction, did not 
significantly affect the propensity to react aggressively in the PSAP game. While this 
result was counter to the original hypothesis, it is not entirely surprising. It may reflect 
the measure itself, and not the effectiveness of the cognitive depletion or self-
affirmation tasks, considering the tasks did affect ESS outcomes. As suggested in the 
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literature review, reactive aggression is linked to feeling status threat in an area that 
someone values.  A recent study by Velez and Hanus (2016) found that in order for an 
outcome to impact one’s self-perception, the person must value the outcome enough 
so that his or her identity is actually contingent upon it. They had participants get 
positive or negative feedback on a purported intelligence test and on a follow-up video 
game. Only those participants who valued success in the video game benefited from 
the positive feedback (i.e., affirmation) of doing well, that is, having it serve as a 
buffer to the negative feedback on the intelligence test. Those who received positive 
feedback in the video game but did not place any sort of value on being successful in 
that measure (i.e., it did not affirm their self-worth) were in turn more defensive to the 
negative feedback on the intelligence test (i.e., status threat). There are several 
different personal interpretations of the PSAP that a participant could have. If they 
neither value winning competitive events, nor view success in the PSAP game as 
being reflective of or connected to their self-worth, no reactivity would be expected. 
So instead of measuring reactive aggression, the PSAP may be measuring the value 
someone puts on being a winner and their unwillingness to hurt (albeit not physical) 
another person to gain that win.  
While the self-affirmation task inherently guarantees that a participant focuses 
on a value that they care about, the PSAP outcome is not guaranteed to be valued, 
particularly since the outcome cannot be singularly defined. It could be that 
participants have a macro-level view of success being an overall win against the other 
person, which can be secured without stealing from them by earning points faster or 
protecting one’s own points. Higgins (2012) describes two different motivations for 
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attaining positive outcomes, one being promotion-focused (i.e., wanting to win) and 
one being prevention-focused (i.e., not wanting to lose). The PSAP, wherein a person 
may or may not actually place value on the outcome, is much like the video game test 
in Velez and Hanus (2016). A participant’s reactivity, be it offensive or defensive, is 
not guaranteed and, therefore, the PSAP may not be a good measure of aggression, in 
general, but rather a measure of how important it is for them to win (promotion-
focused) or not lose (prevention-focused). The importance of internal values and 
motivation was exemplified in Siegel, Brockner, Wiesenfeld, and Liu (2016) in 
conjunction with the use of a self-affirmation manipulation. Self-affirmation was more 
likely to attenuate the avoidance of self-threatening modes of evaluation (i.e., skills-
based versus a more arbitrary measure) for more prevention-focused individuals. In 
other words, if a person was more susceptible to self-threat, self-affirmation buffered 
their avoidance of evaluation measures that opened them up to criticism, but the self-
affirmation had much less of an effect on those who were more promotion-focused.  
The participant may also focus on the micro-level provocations and feel that 
they cannot let the opponent’s thievery go unpunished, if taken as an affront to their 
sovereignty over point accrual. Conversely, they could avoid punishing the other 
person if they felt that retaliation would reflect negatively on their integrity in front of 
the researcher. They could be weighing the consequences of each reaction 
simultaneously, wherein one value (i.e., justified retribution versus the cost of 
appearing petty) is of greater importance to them as an individual. This conundrum is 
what makes measuring reactive aggression difficult in the first place. Reactive 
aggression is not an inherently measurable construct, but rather a broad concept that is 
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used to label a specific type of reaction to a self-threat, arbitrarily defined to fit the 
measure. The intensity of this reactive aggression can only be expected to the extent 
that some part of the measure (e.g., direct benefit of the reaction OR being observed 
behaving that way) holds significant value for the participant.  
Shame 
 
There was a significant increase in ESS scores that was similar across 
conditions, indicating some level of arousal, but given the variability of interpretation 
based on the context, it is difficult to conclude that this was an increase in shame 
rather than an increase in anxiousness. The increase was prominent in the cognitive 
depletion and TOSCA conditions, but not in the control condition, which indicates that 
cognitive load played a similar role. These effects were subdued when participants 
followed up the cognitive depletion or TOSCA exercise with the self-affirmation task. 
The relationships between the cognitive depletion and TOSCA, but not the control 
task, with self-affirmation is not surprising, as it parallels the finding from previous 
studies showing that self-affirmation only mediates effects when the person is at some 
sort of deficit, be it through cognitive depletion (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) or 
stereotype threat (Sherman, et al., 2013). What is important to note is that taking the 
TOSCA questionnaire resulted in similar arousal to a very different, unrelated task, 
that is, writing a story and leaving out certain letters to induce cognitive exhaustion.  
One requires a person to reflect on their moral integrity, the other is a simple letter-
omitting task, yet both result in the increase in arousal.  
The relationship between a greater ESS post-score and increased aggressive 
responses in the PSAP further underscores the potential overlap of intense cognitive 
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processing and ethical decision making with the area of the brain that mediates 
reactive aggression. One may argue that answering the hypothetical questions in the 
TOSCA, and not the content of the TOSCA itself, is what results in the similarity with 
cognitive depletion, but further analysis within the TOSCA group shows a relationship 
between greater ESS pre- and post-scores and increased propensity for shame, 
externalization of blame, and detachment related responses, and a decreased 
propensity for guilt. Considering the difference between measures, TOSCA looks at 
shame proneness by asking participants what they would do/feel in hypothetical 
situations while the ESS looks at physiological indicators that measure feelings of 
shame in that moment. If a person is self-reporting a tendency for feeling ashamed, 
they may have a higher self-awareness wherein they would try to avoid shame by not 
hurting another person, while also protecting themselves from the shame of losing. 
This may indicate that while some people may be more or less prone to feeling 
ashamed, situational shame is still highly dependent on a person’s personal value in 
the worth associated with the task at hand. The participants who had greater ESS post-
scores need not have general shame proneness, but could have a situation specific 
shame, in this case tied to losing or being taken advantage of.  
Those who scored higher in the ESS follow-up measure had greater reactive 
aggression percentages independent of task condition, and they also had greater scores 
in TOSCA’s shame and externalization of blame subscales. The latter seems 
counterintuitive, shame being an internalization of blame while the other shows a 
focus on external factors, but this is similar to the original findings of Tangney, 
Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow (1992). None of the subscales are necessarily 
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mutually exclusive within an individual, and it would make theoretical sense for a 
person who has shame proneness to try to counteract that emotion by attempting to 
place the blame on external circumstances and people.  
Gender Differences 
 
Participants were given the option to choose between more than just male or 
female, but all chose to identify with one of those two categories. In exploratory data 
analysis, a major difference in the trends was found for aggression as it related to 
gender and ESS scores. One way men are socialized to exhibit status is with direct, 
physical aggression (Kimmel & Mahler, 2003), but it is often overlooked that women 
also commit aggressive acts in response to status threat since these acts are more often 
indirect and verbal (Willer, Rogalin, Conlin, & Wojnowicz, 2013). In a review of the 
literature concerning gender differences in anger and aggression, Campbell and 
Muncer (2006) determined that men and women do not differ in reporting, willingness 
or ability to express anger, and, in some cases, women actually reported more anger 
than men, even after controlling for differences in how anger is expressed (Mirowsky 
& Ross, 1995).  
Gender differences were not initially expected in this study because the PSAP 
does not measure typical physical aggression primarily exhibited by males nor the 
indirect aggression primarily exhibited by females. This characterization is supported, 
if only in a null fashion, by an earlier study (Allen & Dougherty, 1996) that found no 
difference in aggressive responses between males and females as measured by the 
PSAP. However, as suggest previously, we cannot conclude that the choice to react 
aggressively was similar between genders based on valuation of the outcome at hand. 
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In a recent study using the PSAP (Geniole, Cunningham, Keyes, Busseri, & 
McCormick, 2015), the provocation cost (number of points per provocation) and 
frequency (how many times during the interval provocation occurred) were 
manipulated to examine differences in how males and females would retaliate and to 
what they would attribute their behavior (i.e., tangible reward = points or status-threat 
= frequency). They found that men were more likely to retaliate when the frequency of 
provocation was greater, a threat to their status, whereas females were more likely to 
retaliate when the cost was greater, a threat to the tangible reward; furthermore, the 
groups explicitly acknowledged those associated reasons for their retaliation. Women 
are less likely to challenge or attack a provoker, at least when under low to moderate 
duress, but, as provocation increases, gender differences become less pronounced 
(Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). In other words, during low and medium levels of 
provocation, men were more likely to respond aggressively, but as the provocation 
increased, women and men were similarly prone to reactive aggression.  
In the current study, each participant (regardless of gender identity) 
experienced the same cost and frequency of provocation, and aggression scores did not 
differ significantly in the cognitive control / other-affirmation condition, similar to 
Allen and Dougherty (1996), although male scores were greater in that condition, 
which could be explained by Bettencourt and Miller (1996) since the experience was 
that of a moderate level of provocation. If, as suggested by Geniole and others (2015), 
males reacted based more on perceived status-threat, then this may be what was being 
effectively manipulated by the self-affirmation task. However, contrary to the 
hypothesis, the self-affirmation task increased the aggressive response rather than 
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decreasing it. One study found that a greater sense of entitlement not only predicted 
unforgiving attitudes, but that self-affirmation exacerbated feelings of vengefulness 
and malevolence (Exline & Zell, 2009).  
Not only is there evidence that a greater sense of entitlement is found in 
college students (Twenge, 2006), but also that this entitlement is greater in males than 
females (Ciani, Summers, & Easter, 2010). Males in both the cognitive depletion and 
control groups were more aggressive in the self-affirmation conditions than the other-
affirmation condition, and the amount of aggression was inversely related to their 
implicit shame (ESS) scores. This was a departure from the expected trend that was 
found with females, wherein aggression was mediated by self-affirmation and had a 
positive correlation with their ESS scores. If ESS scores accurately reflect feelings of 
implicit state shame, then it makes sense that a decreased sense of shame would allow 
for a bolstered sense of entitlement, especially in response to a perceived injustice or 
status-threat, considering that greater entitlement has also been linked to a greater 
sensitivity to feeling offended by transgressions from others (Exline, Baumeister, 
Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 Although the study used experimental methods to isolate the effects of self-
affirmation and cognitive depletion, the sample consisted entirely of college students, 
as is the case with a lot of psychology research. Unfortunately, as discussed in the 
previous section, college students, particularly males, might be more inclined to have a 
greater sense of entitlement, which could lead to dramatic differences in the dependent 
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variables. Given the number of conditions, statistical power was limited in finding 
group differences between genders within the predetermined conditions. 
Future studies could replicate the current design, but should increase the 
sample size and attempt to get an even distribution of self-identified males and 
females to further explore this possible interaction between gender and self-
affirmation and their effects on aggression. Future studies should also consider 
comparing self-reported shame and the ESS scores across all the conditions to 
contribute to the legitimacy of ESS as an implicit measure of shame, and additionally 
explore the gender differences in how shame contributes to aggression. It is worth 
noting once again that the use of the term aggression may be too all-encompassing of 
specific behaviors and reactions, as exemplified in Geniole and others (2015), and 
consideration of extraneous variables, such as sense of entitlement (Exline et al., 
2004), motivation for positive outcomes (Higgins, 2012; Siegel et al., 2016), and 
valuation of outcomes (Velez & Hanus, 2016), is necessary when interpreting the 
intensity and intent of an individual’s reactions to interpersonal confrontation. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1 
Task Order by Condition 
Condition Task Order 
            
1 ESS Control OA PSAP ESS 
2 ESS Control SA PSAP ESS 
3 ESS CogDep OA PSAP ESS 
4 ESS CogDep SA PSAP ESS 
5 ESS TOSCA OA PSAP ESS 
6 ESS TOSCA SA PSAP ESS 
 
Note. ESS = Experiential Shame Scale, CogDep = Cognitive 
Depletion task, TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect Version 3, 
Control = Control for Cognitive Depletion task, SA =  Self-
Affirmation task, OA = Other-Affirmation / Control for Self-
Affirmation task, PSAP = Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm 
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Table 3. Frequency Table: Discrete Variables x Affirmation Condition
Self-Affirmation Other-Affirmation Total Percent
N N N %
Gender
Female 36 37 73 72.3
Male 11 17 28 27.7
Cognitive Task
Cognitive Depletion 17 19 36 35.6
Control 14 20 34 33.7
TOSCA 16 15 31 30.7
ESS Group*
Low ESS 28 20 48 47.5
High ESS 19 34 53 53
Social Values
Conservative 7 8 15 14.9
Moderate 17 27 44 43.6
Libertarian 7 10 17 16.8
Liberal 16 9 25 24.8
Political Party
Republican 7 7 14 13.9
Independent 17 27 44 43.6
Libertarian 7 11 18 17.8
Democrat 16 9 25 24.8
Affirmation Condition
Total 47 54 101 -
Note : * ESS Groups determined through median split of ESS post-scores
Affirmation Condition
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Figure 1. Mean Aggression for Cognitive Task x Affirmation Task  
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Figure 2. Mean ESS Post-score for Cognitive Task x Affirmation Task. Covariates 
appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Total Before = 35.83 
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Figure 3. Mean Aggression Percent – Condition x Gender. 
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Figure 4. Z-Score Trend Comparison between Aggression and ESS Post-Score for 
Condition x Gender. 
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Appendix A 
Sources of Validation Scale 
RANKING OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUES 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, 
some of which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of 
their importance to you from 1 to 11 (1 = most important item, 11 = least important 
item). Use each number only once. 
___ Artistic skills / aesthetic appreciation 
___ Sense of humor 
___ Relations with friends / family 
___ Spontaneity / living life in the moment 
___ Social skills 
___ Athletics 
___ Musical abilities / appreciation 
___ Physical attractiveness 
___ Creativity 
___ Business / managerial skills 
___ Romantic values 
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Appendix B 
Experiential Shame Scale 
Please indicate the number that best describes how you feel right now when 
comparing the two opposite word-states. For example, if you are feeling very 
warm (compared to very cool), mark 1; however, if you are feeling very cool 
(compared to very warm), mark 7. If you are feeling in-between the two states, 
find the number between 1 and 7 that best describes how you feel right now. 
 
   Physically, I feel: 
   
1.   Very Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 R Very Cool 
2.   Normal Heartbeat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Rapid Heartbeat 
3.   Pale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Flushed 
 
  Emotionally, I feel: 
 
4.   Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Bad 
5.   Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Confused 
6.   Content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Distressed 
7.   Calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Highly 
Agitated/Aroused 
 
  Socially, I feel like: 
 
8.   Hiding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 R Being Sociable 
9.   Talking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Being Quiet 
10.  No one sees me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  People are looking at me 
11.  If asked, my peers 
would most likely 
say I have ABOVE 
AVERAGE 
cognitive speed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7     If asked, my peers 
would most likely say I 
have BELOW 
AVERAGE cognitive 
speed. 
 
 
R = Reverse-scored item 
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Appendix C 
    Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed 
by several common reactions to those situations. 
 
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.  Then 
indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described.  We ask you 
to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same 
situation, or they may react different ways at different times.   
 
For example: 
 
 
A.  You wake up early one Saturday morning.  It is cold and rainy outside. 
 
 
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.    1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.     1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.        1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.           1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
 
 
In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by choosing a number.  I 
indicated a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early 
on a Saturday morning -- so it's not at all likely that I would do that.  I chose a "5" for 
answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very 
likely).  I chose a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half.  
Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't -- it 
would depend on what I had planned.  And I chose a "4" for answer (d) because I 
would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.  
 
 
    Please do not skip any items -- rate all responses.  
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him 
up. 
 
   a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."                1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."         1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
  
   c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon     1---2---3---4---5 
       as possible.                                    not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just         1---2---3---4---5 
      before lunch."                                   not likely    very likely   
 
 
 
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it. 
 
   a) You would think: "This is making me anxious.  I      1---2---3---4---5 
      need to either fix it or get someone else to." not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think about quitting.                      1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made        1---2---3---4---5 
      very well these days."                          not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "It was only an accident."          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
 
 
3. You are out with friends one evening, and you're feeling especially witty and 
attractive.  Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company. 
 
   a) You would think: "I should have been aware of what   1---2---3---4---5 
      my best friend is feeling."                     not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would feel happy with your appearance and        1---2---3---4---5 
       personality.                                    not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good      1---2---3---4---5 
      impression.                                      not likely    very likely   
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   d) You would think your best friend should pay          1---2---3---4---5 
      attention to his/her spouse.                    not likely    very likely   
 
   e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long      1---2---3---4---5 
      time.                                            not likely    very likely   
 
 
4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out  
   badly. 
 
   
   a) You would feel incompetent.                          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "There are never enough hours       1---2---3---4---5 
      in the day."                                     not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for     1---2---3---4---5 
      mismanaging the project."                       not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "What's done is done."              1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
 
 
5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. 
 
   a) You would think the company did not like the         1---2---3---4---5 
       co-worker.                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "Life is not fair."                 1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.        1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
      
   d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the      1---2---3---4---5 
      situation.                                       not likely    very likely   
 
 
 
6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call.  At the last minute you 
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well. 
 
   a) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive than   1---2---3---4---5 
      I thought."                                      not likely    very likely   
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   b) You would regret that you put it off.                1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would feel like a coward.                        1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "I did a good job."                 1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   e) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls     1---2---3---4---5 
      you feel pressured into.                        not likely    very likely   
 
7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
 
   a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even        1---2---3---4---5 
      throw a ball.                                    not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think maybe your friend needs more         1---2---3---4---5 
      practice at catching.                            not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think: "It was just an accident."          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would apologize and make sure your friend        1---2---3---4---5 
      feels better.                                    not likely    very likely   
 
 
8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very  
   helpful.  A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as 
   soon as you could. 
 
   a) You would feel immature.                             1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck."    1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could.  1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "I am a trustworthy person."        1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.       1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
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9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
 
   a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been       1---2---3---4---5 
      on the road.                                     not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "I'm terrible."                     1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert            1---2---3---4---5 
      driving down the road.                         not likely    very likely   
 
 
10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well.  Then you find out you 
did poorly. 
 
   a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."           1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."   1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think: "I should have studied harder."     1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would feel stupid.                               1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
    
 
11. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project.  Your boss singles 
you out for a bonus because the project was such a success. 
 
   a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.     1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would feel alone and apart from your             1---2---3---4---5 
      colleagues.                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would feel your hard work had paid off.          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
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   d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.      1---2---3---4---5 
                                                        not likely    very likely   
 
   e) You would feel you should not accept it.             1---2---3---4---5 
                                                        not likely    very likely   
  
 
12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there. 
 
   a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would feel small...like a rat.                   1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think that perhaps that friend should      1---2---3---4---5 
      have been there to defend himself/herself.     not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would apologize and talk about that person's     1---2---3---4---5 
      good points.                                    not likely    very likely   
  
13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work.  People were depending 
on you, and your boss criticizes you. 
 
   a) You would think your boss should have been more      1---2---3---4---5 
      clear about what was expected of you.          not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.              1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think: "I should have recognized the       1---2---3---4---5 
      problem and done a better job."                not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."           1---2---3---4---5 
                                                      not likely    very likely   
 
 
14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children.  
It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work.  You think seriously about 
quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are. 
 
   a) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are       1---2---3---4---5 
      basically lazy.                                  not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would feel you were forced into doing            1---2---3---4---5 
 57 
 
      something you did not want to do.              not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would think: "I should be more concerned         1---2---3---4---5 
      about people who are less fortunate."           not likely    very likely      
 
   d) You would feel great that you had helped others.     1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.         1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
 
 
15. You are taking care of your friend's dog while they are on vacation and the  
dog runs away. 
 
   a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and             1---2---3---4---5 
      incompetent.”                                   not likely    very likely   
 
   b) You would think your friend must not take very       1---2---3---4---5 
      good care of their dog or it wouldn't have run  not likely   very likely 
 away. 
 
   c) You would vow to be more careful next time.          1---2---3---4---5 
                                                       not likely    very likely   
  
   d) You would think your friend could just get a         1---2---3---4---5 
      new dog.                                         not likely    very likely   
 
 
16. You attend your co-worker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on their 
new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
 
   a) You think your co-worker should have expected        1---2---3---4---5 
      some accidents at such a big party.            not likely    very likely   
  
   b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain       1---2---3---4---5 
      after the party.                                 not likely    very likely   
 
   c) You would wish you were anywhere but at              1---2---3---4---5 
      the party.                                       not likely    very likely   
 
   d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to         1---2---3---4---5 
      serve red wine with the new light carpet.      not likely    very likely   
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